Tag: Joe Biden

What Really Happened at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh?

The Twenty-Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP27) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held November 7-20 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, turned out to be important in several ways, but disappointing in others. 

The Most Important Development During COP27 for Long-Term Climate Policy

Ever since Donald Trump was elected U.S. President in November 2016, a major question has been when would the United States and China return to the highly effective co-leadership they had played during the years of the Obama administration in the runup to the Paris Agreement.  This was an important question at last year’s COP26 in Glasgow.  It turned out that this year’s COP27 provided an answer, although in somewhat surprising fashion.

In my view, the most important development during COP27 held November 7-20 in Sharm El-Sheikh, took place six thousands miles away in Bali, Indonesia, when U.S. President Joe Biden and China President Xi Jinping met on November 14 on the sidelines of the G20 summit, shook hands, and engaged on in a three-hour conversation in which, among other topics, they signaled their return to the cooperative stance that had previously been so crucial for international progress on climate change.  That three-hour meeting marked the end of the breakoff of talks that had been initiated by China in response to Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in early August, and the two leaders’ intention to not allow disagreements regarding international trade, human rights, movement away from democracy in Hong Kong, and Taiwan’s security to contaminate their cooperation on climate change.

The discussion between the two heads of state quickly (and explicitly) trickled down to the heads of the respective negotiating teams at COP27 — John Kerry of the United States and Xie Zhenhua of China.  They are longtime friends, but had not been engaged in discussions or cooperation on climate change because of the problems that had existed since August at the highest level between the two governments. After the Biden-Xi meeting in Bali, statements from both John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua indicated that the two countries will resume cooperation.  I believe it is reasonable to anticipate that there may even be something of a return to the co-leadership on climate change policy which China and the United States had previously exercised, and which was absolutely essential for the successful enactment of the Paris Agreement (adopted by 196 Parties at COP21 in Paris, December 12, 2015, and entered into force on November 4, 2016), but cooperation that had disappeared long before Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan, namely with the beginning of the former Trump administration and throughout much of the first two years of the Biden administration.

The Most Contentious and Dramatic Decision at COP27

If the restart of China-U.S. climate cooperation was the most important development during the COP for long-term climate policy, the most dramatic and contentious decision reached within the halls of COP27 by the negotiators from 195 countries was the establishment of a fund for so-called “Loss and Damage,” an issue that has been kicked down the road since it was first floated in 1991 when Vanuatu, a small island nation in the Pacific, suggested the creation of a United Nations fund to help pay for the consequences of rising sea levels.  For thirty years, action on this notion has been delayed, including with a clever approach in the Paris Agreement itself.  One year ago, at the conclusion of COP26 in Glasgow, I predicted that this Loss & Damage issue would be the major focus of this year’s COP27.  My predictions do not always come true, but this one did.

First, some background for those of you who are not UNFCCC/COP junkies.  “Loss and Damage” refers to the range of impacts associated with climate change, since even if emissions are reduced to zero tomorrow morning, damages will continue due to the long lag time of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, particularly CO2 with its atmospheric half-life of more than 100 years.  Most of the Paris Agreement targets reducing emissions (via the mechanism of the Nationally Determined Contributions), and the famous $100 billion commitment for finance from developed countries for developing countries targets mitigation and adaptation.  But adaptation is not possible for all impacts – think about the very existence of small island states, or this year’s floods in Pakistan.

The controversy has been with regard to who should pay for such loss and damage, with the focus on those most responsible for climate change, namely the countries with the greatest contributions to the accumulated stock of GHGs in the atmosphere – the United States and other large, wealthy countries, plus – importantly – China.

This has been controversial because, on the one hand, it is absolutely (and understandably) viewed as essential by countries such as the small island states, whereas countries such as the USA, China, and the EU member states worry that talk of “loss and damage” raises the specter of compensation for bad weather and unlimited legal liability.  Indeed, at some climate talks before the Paris Agreement (2015), debates on this issue nearly caused the talks to collapse. 

But the issue was finessed in the Paris Agreement’s Article 8, which recognizes the importance of loss and damage, but then eliminates the most contentious aspects in Decision 52 (a document that accompanied the Paris Agreement), where the Parties agreed that loss and damage “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.”  Understandably, some countries were not satisfied with this “resolution.”

The developing-country voices regarding loss and damage – this time favoring the creation of a new fund for loss and damage payments – were more prominent at COP26 last year than at any previous COP, but on the final day of the talks last year the wealthy countries blocked such proposals, and instead agreed to talk more about it in the future by setting up a “dialogue” on the issue in future COPs.

That brief history will convey the significance of what happened at COP27, when China, the European Union, and a few other developed countries came out in support of a loss & damage fund; and, then, as the second week of the COP was approaching its close, John Kerry announced that the U.S. also supported (in principle) the creation of such a fund, reversing its long-standing opposition. It’s important to note that the agenda item on Loss & Damage, which was adopted at the outset of COP27 (and was the basis for the Loss & Damage decision), was agreed on the understanding (in the report of the meeting) that Loss & Damage does not involve compensation or legal liability, and, furthermore, that understanding is cross-referenced in the preamble to the Loss & Damage decision. Hence, the important caveat from Decision 52 accompanying the Paris Agreement was reiterated in the Loss & Damage decision produced at COP27.

Such a fund could – on the demand side – eventually amount to trillions of dollars per year.  Note that the World Bank has estimated that this year’s floods in Pakistan caused $40 billion in damages.  However, on the supply side, the few quantitative financial pledges stated thus far are in the tens of millions of dollars.  COP27 established a transition committee to develop recommendations on funding arrangements at COP28 in 2023.  The transition committee will have a majority of developing country representatives (which may not be a prescription for a pragmatic and effective process).

So, is the new Loss and Damage Fund an empty shell?  China is important, as the world’s largest emitter, but not the greatest contributor to the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases, a title held by the United States.  And damages are a function of the existing stock, not the emissions in any year.  However, depending on relative rates of economic growth and other factors, China may become the largest contributor to the stock in a decade or two.  China’s announced position at COP27 was that it supports the creation of the Loss and Damage Fund, but that as a “developing country” it will not be responsible for any contributions to the fund.  By the way, China’s definition of itself as a “developing country” links to the 1992 list of non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC, when China’s per capita GDP was less than $400/year.  The fact that its per capita GDP has grown by 3,330% since then is not considered relevant by China.

Interestingly, there is some convergence on the Loss and Damage Fund between China and the United States, although certainly not in regard to China’s self-proclaimed exemption from financial contributor status.  Rather, the U.S. has a story that winds up in a similar place.  It goes like this.  “We support the Loss & Damage fund, but due to the new Republican majority in the House of Representatives, it is impossible for us to make any commitment of new funding.”  (Minor caveat:  What about a quick move via inclusion in the Omnibus Budget Bill in December, before the Republicans take control?  Not going to happen.)

So, is the new Loss and Damage Fund an empty shell, or is it a principled first step toward equitable allocation of responsibility under the Paris Agreement?  It may be both.  How it will evolve in the future is difficult to say.

Other Developments and Issues at COP27

There were plenty of other debates and developments at COP27, but in my view they were of secondary consequence compared with the Biden-Xi rapprochement and the establishment of the Loss & Damage fund.

Of course, the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and the annual COPs are ultimately and mainly about reducing emissions of GHGs.   There have been many statements in the popular press and from some of the delegations of disappointment because the COP27 closing statement did not fully embrace the 1.5 C target (relative to pre-industrial temperatures), versus 2 C target of the Paris Agreement, nor did it state the intention – in what is really no more than a non-binding resolution – to phase out not just “unabated coal,” as in the Glasgow decision, but all fossil fuels. 

These are valid, indeed important concerns.  But I remember when the Business-as-Usual (BAU) predictions from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were as high as 7.0 C this century, then with Paris, 3 C; then with enhanced Paris & the Kigali amendments to the Montreal Protocol, 2.5 C; and now with the latest pledges from China and India, capping warming at 1.7 C this century may be feasible, according to the International Energy Agency.  Much will depend upon future actions by the large emerging economies – China, India, Brazil, Korea, South Africa, Mexico, and Indonesia – as well as by the United States and other developed countries.  But this COP need not cause excessive hang-wringing, let alone depression.  This is a marathon, not a sprint.

Also, since I have written extensively – and worked at the annual COPs – on international linkage, trading, and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, I should at least note that a variety of technical decisions regarding operationalizing the Article 6.2 mechanism were deferred to COP28.  To some degree, this is good news, since developments with Article 6.2 since the Rulebook for it was completed at COP26 are not encouraging, nor are the interpretations of 6.2 that many policy participants seem to hold.  More about this in the future.

In the meantime, there were also significant discussions and developments regarding a very important non-CO2 GHG, namely methane.  In this regard, in a previous blog post, I described a podcast conversation with my Harvard colleague, Professor Daniel Jacob, who specializes in this realm.  And in my most recent previous blog post, I described my own activities and speaking engagements at COP27 regarding our work at Harvard on satellite-detection of methane concentrations, statistical estimation of related emissions, and development and implementation of appropriate public policies.  This was an important focus of several bilateral meetings at COP27, as well as some of my speaking engagements (others were on carbon pricing).  I’ll have more to say about our methane work and U.S. and global developments in future essays at this blog.

Next Year:  COP28 in Dubai

This year was officially the “Implementation COP,” and next year’s COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), is officially the “Global Stocktake COP.”  But if COP27 was, in effect, the “Loss & Damage COP,” we might anticipate that the incoming UAE presidency of COP28 will make it the “Carbon Removal COP,” with renewed attention to carbon capture & storage, carbon capture & utilization, direct carbon removal, as well as solar radiation management.  If that happens, it will be controversial, like loss & damage was, but for different reasons and with very different parties.

Photos from COP27

Finally, I’m including a few photos below from some of my speaking engagements and meetings.  You can find more photos and stories about activities at COP27 of the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements here.

Entrance to COP27

Speaking at China Pavilion

Panel session at China Pavilion

Speaking at China Pavilion

Group of presenters at China Pavilion

Room View at China Pavilion

Room View of session on Frontiers in Carbon Pricing in IETA Pavilion

Panel session on Frontiers in Carbon Pricing in IETA Pavilion

Panel Session Frontiers in Carbon Pricing in IETA Pavilion

Speaking in IETA Pavilion

Interview with Lisa Friedman, New York Times

Video interview with Michael Jung, Executive Director, ICF Climate Center

Meeting with Prof. Jos Delbeke, European University Institute, and Prof. Simone Borghesi, University of Siena, Italy

View of Room for HPCA-Enel Foundation Side Event on Methane Emissions Reduction

Professor Daniel Jacob speaking at Side Event on Methane Emissions Reduction

Panel at HPCA Side Event with Lena Hoglund Isaksson on Methane Emission Reduction

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International Climate Change Policy & Action in the Biden Administration

Many of us are still reeling from the January 6th insurrection at the Capitol, incited by the current President of the United States.  And our thoughts are now dominated by yesterday’s impeachment of the President and the ongoing threats of violence in Washington and across the country from his extremist supporters.  But in less than one week, a new President will be sworn into office, and so it is prudent to think about the incoming administration and the challenges it will face in regard to climate change policy.  This is the focus of my essay published today by Lawfare, the superb host for analysis and debate about the law, politics, and policy of international security.  With the permission of the Lawfare editors, I’m pleased to be able to reproduce my essay below (with just very minor edits, namely, the insertion of some section headings for purposes of clarity and consistency with the standard style in my blog).  I hope you find this of interest.

L A W F A R E

The Biden Administration and International Climate Change Policy & Action

By Robert N. Stavins

Thursday, January 14, 2021

Former Secretary of State John Kerry, with grand-daughter in tow, signs the Paris Agreement in 2016 (UN Photo by Amanda Voisard)

On Jan. 20, Joe Biden will be inaugurated as the 46th president of the United States. He will face an unprecedented set of challenges, including global climate change—one of four stated policy priorities of his administration (along with the coronavirus pandemic, economic recovery and racial equity)—in addition to the immediate issue of the looming Senate trial of President Trump and ongoing threats of violence from extremist supporters. Because climate change is a global commons problem and international cooperation is necessary to limit free-rider incentives, President-elect Biden has pledged to immediately initiate the process of rejoining the Paris Agreement (from which President Trump withdrew the United States on Nov. 4, 2020—the earliest date permitted by the agreement). Thirty days after the necessary paperwork is filed with the United Nations, the United States will again be a party to the agreement. That’s the easy part. The hard part is coming up with a quantitative statement of how and by how much U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases will be reduced over time.

The Historical Context

To fully appreciate the challenge the new administration will face, it is helpful to reflect on the history of international negotiations that brought us to this point. At the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was first negotiated, committing parties to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Three years later in Berlin at the first annual Conference of the Parties, it was agreed that the wealthier countries (listed in UNFCCC Annex I) would commit to targets and timetables for emission reductions, but not the other 129 (largely developing) countries. This was an attempt to provide for distributional equity among nations —recognizing that the industrialized countries were responsible for the lion’s share of accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and by virtue of their wealth were more capable of taking action. Two years after that, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was enacted, codifying these objectives with quantitative targets for Annex I countries only.

The Clinton administration negotiated the protocol with considerable enthusiasm under the leadership of Vice President Gore, but it did not submit the protocol to the Senate for possible ratification, knowing that the protocol’s lack of any emissions-reduction responsibility for the large emerging economies (China, India, Brazil, Korea, South Africa, Mexico and Indonesia) meant it would fail in the Senate. This was a reasonable assumption, given that the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which said as much, had passed the Senate by a vote of 95-0 just four months before the Kyoto conference.

The Kyoto Protocol was highly flawed. First, the Annex I countries alone could not reduce global emissions, despite a particularly severe target for the U.S., as the significant growth in emissions came from the emerging economies. Second, because the protocol excluded most countries (in particular, developing countries with relatively low costs of emissions mitigation), the costs were vastly greater than need be—four times the cost-effective level by conservative estimates. Third, it was questionable whether distributional equity was even achieved, given that 50 non-Annex I countries had greater per-capita income than the poorest of Annex I nations. So, the United States never ratified Kyoto, and eventually Australia, Canada, Japan and Russia dropped out, leaving the European Union and New Zealand as the only Annex I parties participating (together accounting for 14 percent of global emissions).

Almost two decades after Kyoto, a fundamentally different approach to international climate cooperation was taken by the Paris Agreement of 2015, which was developed under the joint leadership of the U.S. and China during the Obama administration.

The Paris Agreement

The key attribute of the Paris Agreement is its hybrid structure, combining top-down (legally binding) and bottom-up elements. The former are largely procedural (but binding under international law), including a requirement in Article 4 that countries submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs), statements of their emissions reductions from 2020 to 2025/2030), and update them by the end of 2020 and every five years thereafter. The key bottom-up element consists of the set of submitted NDCs, which are not part of the agreement but, rather, are assembled in a separate public registry. The notion is that the NDCs—unlike the negotiated Kyoto targets—arise from or are at least consistent with domestic policies, goals and politics in their respective countries. The “bindingness” of the targets, therefore, comes not from the Paris Agreement itself, but from any domestic laws and regulations put in place to achieve the NDCs. It was because of this structure, which avoided binding quantitative targets in the agreement itself, that the Obama administration felt it was able to ratify it as an executive agreement, without Senate approval.

One year after its approval in Paris, the agreement came into force in November 2016, when the threshold of 55 countries representing at least 55 percent of global emissions had ratified it. Remarkably, it had required seven years for the Kyoto Protocol to achieve the same threshold for coming into force. What caused the exceptionally rapid accumulation of Paris ratifications? The explanation lies in the fact that the agreement also provides that once it comes into force, there is a four-year delay before any ratifying country may withdraw. So, from 2015 to 2016, international concern that Donald Trump might be elected president and live up to his promise to pull the U.S. out of the agreement led countries to move as fast as they could, and the Paris Agreement came into force on Nov. 4, 2016. So, global fear of Trump gets credit (and explains why Trump’s withdrawal date of Nov. 4, 2020, was the earliest allowed).

The U.S. withdrawal from the agreement had no direct effect on domestic greenhouse gas emissions. Those emissions were affected by the Trump administration’s rollbacks of Obama-era domestic climate policies. The greatest concern was that such action by the U.S. would lead China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies to rethink their Paris pledges. But this did not happen, as far as we know. Of course, the comparison ought to be with what those countries would have done had the U.S. not withdrawn, but such a comparison would be with an unobservable hypothetical. It is too soon to assess achievement with the initial set of NDCs, since those describe reductions over the period 2020 to 2025/30, but as of early January 2021, only 23 countries had submitted their updated NDCs, due at the end of 2020.

The Challenge for the Biden Administration

As I said at the outset, the easy part will be submitting the necessary paperwork on Jan. 20 to rejoin the Paris Agreement, but the hard part will be coming up with the new U.S. NDC—a quantitative statement of how and by how much U.S. greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced over time. This will be challenging because the new NDC will need to be sufficiently ambitious to satisfy (at least to some degree) both domestic green groups and some of the key countries of the international community (despite the likelihood that Biden and his special envoy for climate change, John Kerry, will initially find a warm reception and abundant goodwill from most world leaders).

This essentially means that the NDC will need to be at least as ambitious as (and probably more so than) the Obama administration target of a 26-28 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2025, compared with 2005 (which would have been difficult to achieve even if Hillary Clinton had become president). And it will need to compare favorably with the targets now being announced by other major emitters. For example, the European Union is enacting a new target to cut its emissions 55 percent below its 1990 level by 2030. And China recently said it will achieve carbon neutrality (zero net emissions) by 2060.

But if significant ambition is one necessary condition for the new Biden NDC, the other necessary condition is that it be credible, that is, truly achievable given existing and reasonably anticipated policy actions. The only way that both of these necessary conditions can be achieved is with aggressive new domestic climate legislation.

Is Ambitious Climate Legislation Feasible?

Even with the Democratic-controlled Senate—with a one-vote margin—meaningful and ambitious climate legislation will be difficult, if not impossible. The budget reconciliation process, whereby only a simple majority is needed to pass legislation, rather than the 60 votes required to cut off Senate debate, can be used to reverse some of Trump’s last-minute policies that are connected to the tax code or mandatory spending if every Democrat or enough Republicans to make up for any defections support the given move. And the one-vote margin can be effective for confirming Biden’s appointees, and it can help for increasing the budgets of federal agencies. But for ambitious climate (or other) legislation, the 60-vote threshold will be the binding constraint.

Under these circumstances, it will be challenging, to say the least, for Democrats to enact Biden’s climate plan, including its $2 trillion in spending over four years with the goal of making all U.S. electricity carbon free in 15 years and achieving net-zero emissions economy-wide by 2050. An analysis by the Rhodium Group suggests that to be on a steady path to achieve Biden’s 2050 goal, a cut of 43 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 would be necessary—in other words, a reduction of about 3 percent every year. Also, keep in mind that the Obama administration’s major climate legislation—the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (the so-called Waxman-Markey bill)—failed to receive a vote in the Senate, even though Democrats (and independents who caucused with Democrats) then held a total of 59 seats. Although climate change is now taken more seriously by the public and receives considerably greater attention in political circles than it did 12 years ago, the prospects over the next two to four years for comprehensive climate legislation—such as a truly meaningful carbon-pricing system—are not good.

But other legislation that would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the long term appears more feasible. That includes a post-coronavirus economic stimulus bill, which might have a green tinge, if not a fully green hue. The Obama administration’s stimulus package enacted 13 years ago in response to the Great Recession included some $90 billion in clean energy investments and tax incentives. Another candidate will be a future infrastructure bill, something both parties seem to recognize is important to upgrade aging U.S. infrastructure. This could include funding for improvements in the national electricity grid, which will be necessary to facilitate greater reliance on renewable sources of electricity generation.

Less Ambitious, But Bipartisan Climate Legislation

Finally, there are possibilities for less ambitious but bipartisan climate legislation, with stringency and scope much less than what Biden’s climate plan calls for. The key approaches here might involve tax incentives, that is, nearly every politician’s favorite instrument—subsidies. This may fit well with Biden’s moderate approach to governing and his stated desire to work with both parties in Congress. Specific bipartisan options could include (explicit or implicit) subsidies targeting wind and solar power, carbon capture and storage/utilization, nuclear power, technology initiatives, and electric vehicles via a rebate program.

But such modest, bipartisan initiatives are unlikely to satisfy either the demands of domestic climate policy advocates or international calls for action. Because of this, the new administration—like the Obama administration—may have to opt for regulatory approaches.

Possibilities for Regulatory Actions

The new president, under existing authority, could quickly take actions through executive orders in a number of areas to reverse many of Trump’s regulatory rollbacks. Will Democrats use the Congressional Review Act, which allows Congress to nullify a rule within 60 legislative days of its adoption? Republicans used this at the end of the Obama administration, but the law prohibits Congress from later adopting a regulation that is of “substantially the same form” as the disapproved rule unless it is specifically authorized by a subsequent law.

More generally, new oil and gas leasing on federal lands could again be prohibited, and the White House could attempt to block the Keystone XL pipeline from being completed. More promising, the president could direct that the social cost of carbon (SCC) be revised, presumably returning it to the Obama administration’s appropriate use of global (not just domestic) damages and a 3 percent (rather than 7 percent) discount rate in the calculations, thereby increasing the SCC from about $1 to $50 per ton, and directing federal agencies to use the revised SCC in their own decision-making. Presumably, the new administration will move to reinstate and surpass the Obama administration’s ambitious corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, which is justified by the SCC.

Also, there is the possibility of using the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission to use financial regulation of publicly traded companies to raise the cost of capital for fossil energy development, or to set standards for disclosure of climate-related corporate information. Likewise, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has itself begun to explore options via its Market Risk Advisory Committee.

Thus, regulatory approaches under existing statutory authority through rule-making often appear to be an attractive option, but using new regulations under existing legislation rather than enacting new laws raises another problem—the courts. Rule-making entails lengthy notice and comment periods and requires extensive records and interagency consultation. Furthermore, rules are frequently subject to litigation. The Obama administration promulgated its Clean Power Plan after the Senate failed to deliver on the administration’s comprehensive climate legislation. And the Clean Power Plan was subject to a stay from the U.S. Supreme Court even before Trump entered office. Then Trump arrived and killed the regulation outright.

But the real challenge to the regulatory approach is that new regulations are much more likely to be successfully challenged in federal courts in 2021 than they were during the Obama years. This is partly because there are 228 Trump-appointed federal judges. But more importantly, the Supreme Court’s new 6-3 conservative majority is likely to favor a relatively literal reading of statutes, giving executive departments and agencies much less flexibility to go beyond the letter of the law or to interpret statutes in “innovative ways.” In particular, the Supreme Court may move to modify or even overrule the critical Chevron Doctrine, under which federal courts defer to administrative agencies when Congress was less than explicit on some issue in a statute (such as whether carbon dioxide can be regulated under sections of the Clean Air Act of 1970 intended for localized pollutants).

Other National and Sub-National Climate Policies

During the presidential transition, there has been considerable talk about a “whole of government” approach to climate change, in which the White House pushes virtually all departments and agencies to put in place changes that are supportive of decarbonizing the economy. This would be beyond or instead of the focused statutory and regulatory policies described above. Of course, the critical question is what such an approach can produce in terms of short-term emissions reductions and/or long-term decarbonizing of the economy. This is, at best, an open question.

Of course, even if little can be accomplished at the federal level over the next two to four years, surely the new administration will not be hostile to states and municipalities taking more aggressive action. Indeed, climate policies at the state level (California) and regional level (the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast) have become increasingly important, particularly during the four years of the Trump administration. Bottom-up evolution of national climate policy may continue to evolve from the Democratic-leaning states in the Northeast, Middle Atlantic, Upper Midwest, Southwest and West Coast (and Georgia!), which together represent more than half of the U.S. population and an even larger share of economic activity and greenhouse gas emissions.

A Note of Optimism for the Path Ahead

The new administration may or may not find creative ways to break the logjam that has prevented ambitious national climate change policies from being enacted (or, if enacted, to be sustainable). My greatest source of optimism is that the Biden-Harris team, in sharp contrast to the Trump-Pence administration, gives every indication that it will embrace scientific and other expertise across the board—whether that means the best epidemiologists and infectious disease experts designing an effective strategy for the coronavirus, or the best scientists, lawyers and economists designing sound climate policies that are also politically feasible.

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Reflecting on Trump’s Record and Anticipating Biden’s Performance

On January 20th, a bit more than two weeks from today, Joe Biden will be sworn in as the 46th President of the United States, along with Kamala Harris as Vice President.  Changes from one U.S. administration to another are always significant, but sometimes the anticipated changes are not dramatic when the same political party retains the White House, although the last time that happened was the transition in 1988 from Ronald Reagan to George H.W. Bush.  That said, I do not recall a transition that has represented anticipated changes – in terms both of style and substance – as great as the transition from President Trump to President-Elect Biden.

            One of the areas – among others – where that is the case is the realm of environmental, energy, and natural resource policy.  And there is no one better qualified to reflect on the environmental record of the Trump administration and the prospects of the forthcoming Biden administration that Richard Revesz, my long-time colleague, co-author, and friend.  He is my guest in the latest episode of my podcast, released today, January 5th, on the day a pair of Senate runoff elections in Georgia are taking place (which will determine which political party controls the Senate for at least the next two years).

            As readers of this blog know, in these podcasts – “Environmental Insights: Discussions on Policy and Practice from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program – I talk with well-informed people from academia, government, industry, and NGOs.  Ricky fits the bill as the Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University, where he was previously Dean, and was the co-founder of the Institute for Policy Integrity.  He is also the co-author with Michael Livermore of a new and important book, Reviving Rationality: Saving Cost-Benefit Analysis for the Sake of the Environment and Our Health.

            You can hear our complete conversation in the Podcast here.

First of all, reflecting on the past four years of the Trump Administration, Revesz points to the decisions to:  roll back motor vehicle energy efficiency (or CAFE) standards; repeal the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan; and pursue what the Trump administration termed “strengthening” regulation – all as examples of bad policies with negative consequences.

“On virtually any significant environmental issue, the Trump Administration was on the wrong side. It was on the wrong side of the legal issues; it was in the wrong side of the economic issues; it was in the wrong side of the scientific issues. And it was really on the wrong side of history,” he remarks.  Revesz also implies that the administration’s disrespect for science and economics might have very deep and injurious impacts on environmental policy going forward. 

However, Revesz expresses optimism that the incoming administration may be able to undo some of the damage done over the past four years.

“I am extremely hopeful and very optimistic that the Biden Administration will restore confidence in science and economics, and that these will be taken as serious analytical frameworks, and not as tools to be bent at will to justify the political preferences of the moment,” he says. “And that is extremely important because I don’t think our country could take another four years of the bending of truth without it having very serious long-term repercussions.”

Revesz also says he expects the Biden-Harris Administration to hold true on its campaign promises to push forward with tough greenhouse gas emission policies. 

“I expect we’ll see a continued significant ratcheting down of automobile emissions, including much greater penetration of zero emitting vehicles.  And we will see very significant work, I assume and hope, on the stationary source side. Even in the Obama Administration, where we ended up with regulations for new oil and gas facilities, we didn’t have regulations for existing facilities, which is where a lot of the emissions are. The electric sector will have to be looked at. And then other industrial sectors that have not yet been being gotten attention, like refinery cement plants, will need to get significant attention. So, I see a lot happening on the regulatory side.”

Despite the challenges the Biden-Harris Administration may face from legal challenges to new regulatory actions because of the 220 judges appointed by President Trump as well as the new 6-3 conservative majority in the Supreme Court, Ricky Revesz maintains that the new administration will be much more successful in defending its regulatory actions in the courts than was the Trump administration, which lost an astonishingly high 83 percent of challenges against its regulatory actions.

All of this and more is found in the latest episode of “Environmental Insights: Discussions on Policy and Practice from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.”  I hope you will listen to this latest discussion here.  You can find a complete transcript of our conversation at the website of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.

My conversation with Professor Revesz is the 19th episode in the Environmental Insights series, with future episodes scheduled to drop each month.  Previous episodes have featured conversations with:

“Environmental Insights” is hosted on SoundCloud, and is also available on iTunes, Pocket Casts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

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