Category: Politics

The Papal Encyclical and Climate Change Policy

On June 18, 2015, Coral Davenport, writing in the New York Times, was the first in the press to note that the encyclical on the environment, Laudato Si’, released by Pope Francis that same day, with tremendous praise from diverse quarters, “is as much an indictment of the global economic order as it is an argument for the world to confront climate change.”

The New York Times and a Couple of Asia Trips

The Times article included the following: “…environmental economists criticized the encyclical’s condemnation of carbon trading, seeing it as part of a radical critique of market economies. ‘I respect what the pope says about the need for action, but this is out of step with the thinking and the work of informed policy analysts around the world, who recognize that we can do more, faster, and better with the use of market-based policy instruments — carbon taxes and/or cap-and-trade systems,’ Robert N. Stavins, the director of the environmental economics program at Harvard, said in an email. The approach by the pope, an Argentine who is the first pontiff from the developing world, is similar to that of a ‘small set of socialist Latin American countries that are opposed to the world economic order, fearful of free markets, and have been utterly dismissive and uncooperative in the international climate negotiations, Dr. Stavins said.”

Those are accurate quotes from an email I sent to Coral Davenport in response to her inquiry the same day. The reason why I sent an email, rather than calling was that I was, at that moment, approximately 37,000 feet over the Pacific Ocean, flying from Seoul (where I had spoken at the third annual Future Energy Forum) to San Francisco, on my way home to Boston.

The following week, I was flying back to Asia (this time to Beijing for a workshop jointly sponsored by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and China’s National Development and Reform Commission – a topic for a future blog post, but not for today). As I sat in the departure lounge at Chicago’s O’Hare International, I began to see on my iPhone a small flood of hostile commentary from the blogosphere, indicating that I had unfairly “attacked the Pope.”

Well, writing an email rather than chatting on the phone with a reporter may eliminate some spontaneity, but it does have the advantage of preserving a record. So, I’m pleased to be able to share with readers today the views I offered on June 18th, long before the Pope’s recent visit to Cuba and the United States. My views have not changed.

Why Write About This Now?

That’s a reasonable question. In part, I’m inspired by a marvelous essay by Yale professor William Nordhaus, “The Pope & the Market,” which appears in the October 8, 2015 issue of The New York Review of Books. However, my thoughts are completely independent from his, and so he should not be indicted for anything I have to say. But I do heartily recommend his essay, and urge readers to take a look at his commentary (as well as mine).

With that preamble out of the way, here are the reactions of one environmental economist, yours truly, to Laudato Si’, nearly verbatim from my June 18th message from 37,000 feet over the Pacific Ocean, with some additional text and links for this blog essay.

An Environmental Economist Reflects on the Papal Encyclical

The Pope is to be commended for taking global climate change seriously, and for drawing more world attention to the issue. There is much about the encyclical that is commendable, but where it drifts into matters of public policy, I fear that it is – unfortunately – not helpful.

The long encyclical ignores the causes of global climate change: it is an externality, an unintended negative consequence of otherwise meritorious activity by producers producing the goods and services people want, and consumers using those goods and services. That’s why the problem exists in the first place. There may well be ethical dimensions of the problem, but it is much more than a simple consequence of some immoral actions by corrupt capitalists.

The document also ignores the global commons nature of the problem, which is why international cooperation is necessary. If the causes of the problem are not recognized, it is very difficult – or impossible – to come up with truly meaningful and feasible policy solutions.

So, yes, the problem is indeed caused by a failure of markets, as the Pope might say, or – in the language of economics – a “market failure”. But that is precisely why sound economic analysis of the problem is important and can be very helpful. Such analysis points the way to working through the market for solutions, rather than condemning global capitalism per se.

Should Carbon Markets be Condemned?

In surprisingly specific and unambiguous language, the encyclical rejects outright “carbon credits” as part of a solution to the problem. It says they “could give rise to a new form of speculation and would not help to reduce the overall emission of polluting gases”. The encyclical asserts that such an approach would help “support the super-consumption of certain countries and sectors”.

That misleading and fundamentally misguided rhetoric is straight out of the playbook of the ALBA countries, the small set of socialist Latin American countries that are opposed to the world economic order, fearful of free markets, and have been utterly dismissive and uncooperative in the international climate negotiations. Those countries have been strongly opposed to any market-based approaches to climate change, including carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, and offset systems, as well as any approaches that would allow – through appropriate linkage – the financing by one country of emissions reductions in another country (see my previous essay at this blog on A Key Element for the Forthcoming Paris Climate Agreement).

If the references to “carbon credits” were intended to refer only to offset systems (such as the Clean Development Mechanism) and not to cap-and-trade systems, then I would be much less concerned about the Pope’s complaints. However, the encyclical does not make the distinction. Indeed, I doubt that the authors of the encyclical recognize the difference, and unfortunately, readers of the encyclical will likewise lump together all carbon markets, which is what some policy makers also do, unfortunately.

Out of Step

I respect what the Pope says about the need for action, but his unfortunate attack on the use of the market to address climate change is out of step with the thinking and the work of informed policy analysts and policy makers around the world, who recognize that we can do more, faster, and better with the use of market-based policy instruments – carbon taxes and/or cap-and-trade systems. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has been outspoken in precisely this regard.

Furthermore, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change itself (Article 3.3) explicitly states that “policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost” and thereby be more ambitious. That is why market-based climate policy instruments are an important option for many countries. Keeping costs down will help inspire greater action.

Concluding Thoughts

The Papacy is to be commended for having drawn attention to climate change as a major issue. But, sadly, the encyclical fails to recognize that because externalities (such as CO2 emissions) are a type of market failure and because the global commons nature of the problem and consequent free riding are also a profound market failure, it is for these reasons that working through the market is absolutely necessary – in order to address the climate problem in ways that are scientifically meaningful, economically sensible, and ultimately politically pragmatic.

By incorporating the anti-market rhetoric of the ALBA countries, the encyclical unfortunately goes beyond these errors of omission to incorporate significant errors of commission by emphasizing a perspective that is not progressive and enlightened, and would – I fear – ultimately work against meaningful climate policy at the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels.

That is why I said that although there is much about the encyclical that is commendable, where it drifts into matters of public policy it is – unfortunately – not helpful.

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A Key Element for the Forthcoming Paris Climate Agreement

The upcoming Paris climate negotiations will constitute a critical step in the ongoing international process to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The question of whether the Paris outcome will be sufficiently ambitious to put the world on a path towards limiting global average warming to 2o C, as agreed in Cancun, can be answered now.  It will not, because that target, while possibly useful as an aspirational goal, is not achievable, as the most recent report of Working Group III of the IPCC documented. What is clear, however, is that greater ambition is more easily realized when costs are low. Market-based mechanisms are an important element in the portfolio of actions that can lead to cost-effective solutions. Linkage – between and among market and non-market systems for reducing GHG emissions – is a closely-related key element.

In an article just published in Climate Policy, “Facilitating Linkage of Climate Policies through the Paris Outcome,” my co-authors – Daniel Bodansky of Arizona State University, Seth Hoedl of Harvard Law School, and Gilbert Metcalf of Tufts University – and I examine how the Paris outcome, and more generally the ongoing climate negotiations, can allow for and advance linked systems.

Brief Background

In the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2011, the parties agreed to develop a “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties,” for adoption at COP-21 in December, 2015, in Paris. It is likely that the Paris outcome will reflect a hybrid climate policy architecture – one that combines top-down elements, such as for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), with bottom-up elements, including “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” (INDCs), describing what a country intends to do to reduce emissions, based on domestic political feasibility and other factors. This outcome will be embodied in a core agreement, which likely will be legally binding, as well as ancillary instruments such as annexes, national schedules, and COP decisions.

The ability to link regional, national, and sub-national climate policies will be essential to enhancing the cost-effectiveness of such a system – and thus the likelihood of achieving significant global emissions reductions. By ‘linkage’, we mean formal recognition by a GHG mitigation program in one jurisdiction (a regional, national, or sub-national government) of emission reductions undertaken in another jurisdiction for the purposes of complying with the first jurisdiction’s requirements.

First Necessity for Paris: Do No Harm

The minimum requirement for the Paris agreement in regard to linkage is to do no harm. Silence on linkage could possibly accomplish that. But any provisions in the agreement that would require nations to achieve their respective INDCs exclusively within their own borders – a constraint that has been favored by the ALBA countries – would, in effect, prohibit not only international carbon markets but any sort of meaningful linkage (and would thereby greatly drive up costs).

Common Definitions of Key Terms

If linkage is to play a significant role in a hybrid international policy architecture, then several categories of design elements merit serious consideration for inclusion in the Paris outcome, either directly or by establishing a process for subsequent international negotiations. In general, effective linkage requires common definitions of key terms, including particularly the units to be used for compliance purposes. This will be particularly important for links between heterogeneous systems, and it is an area where a model rule could be particularly helpful (more about this below).

Registries and Tracking

Linkage requires registries and tracking mechanisms, whether the systems being linked are homogeneous or heterogeneous. Indeed, a key role for the top-down part of a hybrid architecture that allows for international linkage of national policy instruments will be the tracking, reporting, and recording of allowance unit transactions.

International compliance units would make the functioning of an international transaction log more straightforward and reduce the administrative burden of reconciling international registries with national registries. Minimum standards for approving and measuring offsets may be important. Market oversight and monitoring may increase confidence in the system, although in some cases, national and international institutions that can provide oversight already exist and may need only relatively minor additional capacity to assume these functions.

Too Much of a Good Thing Can be Bad

Including detailed linkage rules in the core agreement is not desirable as this could make it difficult for rules to evolve in light of experience. Instead, minimum standards to ensure environmental integrity should be elaborated in COP decisions, or by other means; for example, the COP could establish minimum requirements for national monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), registries, and crediting mechanisms.

In terms of linkage, the function of the core agreement might be confined to articulating general principles relating to environmental integrity, while also authorizing the COP or another organization to develop more detailed rules. Whatever minimum standards are adopted, oversight of compliance will be important to ensure the integrity both of the Paris outcome and of linked national systems.

The Utility of Default or Model Rules

Many elements of GHG linkage can be addressed through default or model rules from which nations are free to deviate at their discretion. Rules that may benefit from this approach are typically concerned with the details of linking two regulatory systems. For example, nations interested in linking their cap-and-trade systems would have to consider rules for market coverage, cost containment, banking and borrowing, compliance periods, allocation methods, and the treatment of new emitters and emitter closures. Additional rules may be needed for linking of heterogeneous systems.

Developing uniform rules to address all of these issues is unrealistic. Instead, a degree of harmonization could be achieved through default rules that facilitate linkage by providing a common framework for nations to use when developing their own linkage agreements. Although there is no need for the core agreement itself to elaborate harmonized linkage rules, it might authorize the COP to develop default linkage rules that nations can use in negotiating bilateral linkage agreements.

Less is More

In our Climate Policy article, Dan Bodansky, Seth Hoedl, Gib Metcalf, and I conclude that the most valuable outcome of Paris regarding linkage might simply be the inclusion in the core agreement of an explicit statement that parties may transfer portions of their INDCs to other parties and that these transferred units may be used by the transferees to implement their INDCs. Such a statement would help provide certainty both to governments and private market participants. This minimalist approach will allow diverse forms of linkage to arise, among what will inevitably be highly heterogeneous INDCs, thereby advancing the dual objectives of cost effectiveness and environmental integrity in the international climate policy regime.

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Crude Oil Prices, Climate Change, and Global Welfare

A few weeks ago, I participated in a panel session titled, “The Remarkable Transformation of the Energy Sector: Does it Also Transform Our World.” The motivating question was: “Is the dramatic decline in oil prices a complete gift to the West because of the enormous funds being saved, or is it an unintended Trojan horse because development of renewable energy as well as new fossil-fuel sources will decline in the West, posing longer new challenges?”

The other members of the panel – from private industry – had vastly more expertise (and relevant insights) on fossil-fuel markets, but here’s what I had to say. This is hardly at the sweet spot of my professional competence, so I welcome your comments and corrections! In general, how would you answer that question?

Causes

I start (and started) from the premise that the dramatic decline in crude oil prices that took place from August, 2014 ($96/barrel), to March, 2015 ($44/barrel), was due – on the one hand – to decreased demand, a function of slow economic growth in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere, endogenous, price-driven technological change leading to greater fuel efficiency, and policy-driven technological change that also has been leading to greater fuel efficiency, such as more stringent Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the United States; and – on the other hand – was due to increased supply, partly a function of the growth of unconventional (tight) U.S. oil production (a product of the combination of two technologies – horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing).  And, in the presence of all of this, Saudi Arabia decided not to restrict its output to prop up prices.

[Before proceeding, I should note that since May of this year, crude oil prices have increased by about 30% from their March low, but as of May ($60/barrel) are still far below their August 2014 level.]

Consequences

When one examines virtually any significant price change from an economic perspective, there inevitably seems to be both good news and bad news. So with the fall in crude oil prices.

The Bad News

First of all, I assume that low crude oil prices are problematic for the economic and political stability of some of the oil-producing/exporting countries, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, Venezuela, and Nigeria.  (For details, see Bordoff and Losz 2015, below.)

Second, it’s frequently been asserted that low oil prices are bad news for the development of alternative forms of energy, including renewable sources. Of course, in the United States, there isn’t much effect on electricity generation from renewable (wind and solar), because in the U.S. electricity sector, renewable supplies compete with coal and natural gas, not with fuel oil (but in other countries, which use more fuel oil for electricity generation than we do, there can be a disincentive for renewable dispatch – and hence development).

Third, there can be – indeed, has been – a major impact in the U.S. motor fuels sector, where the market for biofuels (mainly ethanol) is negatively affected by low conventional gasoline prices. However, these impacts must be somewhat muted by public policies, which directly or indirectly subsidize (or, in fact, require) the use of biofuels.

Fourth, low gasoline prices have resulted in decreased demand by consumers for motor vehicles with high fuel efficiency, and SUV and pickup truck sales have rebounded from previous lows. But these effects are also muted, to some degree, by public policies, including U.S. CAFE standards.   Finally, low gasoline prices also have short-term effects in the form of more driving and fuel use by the existing fleet of motor vehicles, which is bad news in terms of emissions (and congestion).

Differences across Sectors

Before turning to the “good news” about low crude oil prices (and there surely is good news), it’s worthwhile noting that whether individual businesses find these low prices to be good or bad depends largely upon the economic sector in which they operate. For example, whereas commercial airlines are finally making profits, due to the low price of jet fuel (their most important variable operating cost), manufacturers of commercial aircraft will see lower demand for new planes if low jet fuel prices become the long-term norm. The primary factor driving the larger airlines to replace aircraft in their fleets is the lower operating costs due to the much greater fuel efficiency of new models.

And, of course, low oil prices are systematically bad news for oil producers, including the major U.S. companies.

The Good News

Finally, here is the upside of these significant changes in crude oil markets.

Low oil prices are unambiguously good for aggregate global welfare. This includes consumers in the United States, Europe, Japan, and South Korea. And, at least temporarily, OPEC seems to have lost its ability to set a price floor.

Low oil prices mean an increase in consumers’ disposable income, amounting to nearly $2,500 per U.S. household annually, according to Stephen Brown (see below).  If we subtract the income losses to U.S. oil producers, the net gain per U.S. household amounts to a bit more than $800 per year, with gains accruing disproportionately to low-income households.

Turning to the environmental realm, there is also good news, or at least the possibility of good news. An opportunity for new, sensible energy and climate change policies has emerged with these low oil prices.

First, now is the time to reduce – or better yet, phase out – costly and inefficient fuel subsidies, which exist in many parts of the world, particularly in developing countries.

Second, with gasoline prices relatively low – and natural gas supplies holding down electricity prices, at least in the United States – there has never been a better time to introduce progressive climate policies in the form of carbon-pricing, whether via carbon taxes or through carbon cap-and-trade. Unfortunately, none of us should hold our breath waiting for that to happen.

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For further reading, I recommend:

Bordoff, Jason, and Akos Losz.  “Oil Shock: Decoding the Causes and Consequences of the 2014 Oil Price Drop.”  Horizons, Spring 2015, Issue No. 3, pp. 190-206.

Brown, Stephen P. A.  “Falling Oil Prices: Implications in the United States.” Resources, Number 189.  Washington:  Resources for the Future, 2015, pp. 40-44.

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