Last night, I was privileged to deliver an after-dinner speech at Harvard’s Loeb House for the close to 100 attendees at the “Harvard-Tsinghua Workshop on Climate Change, Carbon Neutrality, and Energy System Transformation,” sponsored by the Harvard China Project, which was itself founded 30 years ago and still chaired by the legendary Micheal McElroy, Gilbert Butler Professor of Environmental Studies, Harvard Paulson School of Engineering & Applied Sciences and Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, and led with Executive Director, Chris Nielsen. I was asked to discuss “The Evolving China-USA Climate Relationship,” which is what I did.
My comments in my after-dinner talk seemed to be well received by the audience, and prompted some interesting questions and follow-up discussion, so I thought I ought to share my commentary with the readers of this blog. Hence, this brief essay draws on my equally brief speech.
I discussed one of the most consequential relationships shaping the future of our planet: the evolving climate policy dynamic between China and the USA. These two nations, the world’s largest economies and biggest carbon emitters, hold the key to global efforts to combat climate change. How they cooperate — or fail to do so — may determine not just their own environmental futures, but the future of all societies.
I tried to provide some historical context, because I believe that in order to understand where we are today, we need to look at where we’ve been. For much of the 20th century, the U.S. and China approached climate change in vastly different ways. The U.S., as an early industrialized nation, contributed significantly to historical emissions but also played a leading role in scientific research on climate change. China, on the other hand, industrialized later but very rapidly, surpassing the U.S. in annual emissions in the mid-2000s.
But, despite differences, there have been moments of intense collaboration. One of the most significant was surely the lead-up in 2014-2015 to the Paris Climate Agreement, including joint announcements of emission reduction targets by Presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, which helped pave the way for the historic 2015 accord, in which nearly 200 countries pledged to limiting GHG emissions.
So, why did China and the USA take on such co-leadership? I attribute it to a convergence of their perspectives: their annual CO2 emissions converged in 2006; their cumulative emissions are gradually converging, the future date of which will largely depend on relative rates of economic growth; both countries have huge coal reserves; and both countries have featured sub-national, emissions trading policies.
This partnership has not been without serious setbacks, however. Political shifts have influenced the trajectory of climate diplomacy. During the first Trump administration, cooperation began to collapse. To some degree, climate policy problems at that time (and since) were collateral damage of geopolitical tensions regarding international trade, human rights, democracy in Hong Kong, independence of Taiwan, security in Asia, and other issues. But to a considerable degree, the lack of cooperation was intentional with Trump’s announcement in 2017 to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, which did not take effect, of course, until November 2020.
So, climate negotiations persisted, with China and the U.S. co-chairing the Enhanced Transparency Framework negotiating stream of the UNFCCC throughout the Trump years. And the U.S. position did not seem to affect other countries’ commitments: China proved happy to evolve from co-leadership to sole leadership; and India did not retrench. Only Brazil did so, among the major emitters, but that was because of the election of Jair Bolsonaro, not because of Trump’s actions.
Of course, in recent years, we’ve seen renewed commitment to climate action. The Biden administration re-entered the Paris Agreement, establishing ambitious climate goals, including net-zero emissions by 2050. Likewise, China pledged to peak emissions before 2030, and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. And at the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia in 2022, just before COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, the two Presidents met and signaled – without much detail – their renewed cooperation on climate change. Then, a year later, just before COP28 in Dubai, U.A.E. in 2023, the two Presidents signed their “Sunnylands Statement,” signaling that they might indeed return to co-leadership on global climate change.
But important impediments remained, Biden accepted parts of Trump’s “America First” approach, creating his own “American Manufacturing First” theme of industrial policy, highlighted by (protectionist) investment and production subsidies for a range of climate technologies and strategies in the Inflation Reduction Act (as China has employed for many years!).
Today, domestic politics, economic competition, and mutual distrust continue to create serious roadblocks. And with the second Trump administration, we’ve gone from bad to worse. The U.S. imposed new tariffs on imports from China, and China quickly responded with countermeasures. And this time, Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will be completed in just one year, not four years. Also, this time, U.S. withdrawal may have significant effects on other countries. For example, Indonesia, Argentina, and even New Zealand have talked about withdrawing. Equally important, India and a number of other major countries did not bother to meet the February 10th deadline for submitting new targets under Paris.
Much of that may sound quite pessimistic, so I tried to offer a somewhat positive conclusion. Eight years ago, the annual climate talks took place in Marrakech, Morocco, just a week after Trump had been elected the first time in November 2016. I was invited to speak in the China Pavilion, as I have been each year. There was much lamenting on the panel about the 4-year Trump presidency that was about to begin, and I was last on the panel to speak. My Chinese host and moderator introduced me with, “Now, we hope that Professor Stavins can bring some good news from the United States.” I did not know what to say, so after a long pause, I stated, “When you get to be my age, you realize that four years is not a long time.”
Where does this leave us in 2025? At present, civil society, businesses, subnational governments, and academics can continue to play critical roles in fostering collaboration between China and the United States, as Harvard’s China Project has done for many years. And, in any event, climate policy developments will continue, such as with ambitious new targets — and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism — from the European Union, which may lead to an international “carbon-pricing club.”
In conclusion, I’ve tried to suggest in these brief comments that the evolving relationship between China and the U.S. on climate policy is complex, shaped by history, shaped by competition, shaped by domestic politics, and – we hope – perhaps shaped by an urgent need for action. As the two largest carbon emitters, these nations have a strategic, even a moral responsibility to lead the world toward a sustainable future. The path ahead will not be easy, and I will add – as an economist – that it will not be cheap. But if these two global powers can again find common ground in addressing climate change, as they have in the past, then they can set a remarkable, effective precedent for rest of the world. The future of all societies may depend upon it.
