It’s well known that the Paris Agreement has achieved broad participation by countries accounting for some 97% of global GHG emissions (in contrast to the 14% of global emissions associated with countries taking on responsibilities under the current commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol). That is a very important accomplishment, but as negotiations begin to elaborate key details of the Agreement (as they will in Bonn in November), a critical question is how to create incentives for countries to increase ambition over time. The ability to link different climate policies, such that emission reductions undertaken in one jurisdiction can be counted toward the mitigation commitments of another jurisdiction, may help Parties increase ambition over time. A new paper from the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements by Michael Mehling of MIT, Gilbert Metcalf of Tufts University, and myself explores options and challenges for facilitating such linkages in light of the considerable heterogeneity that is likely to characterize regional, national, and sub-national efforts to address climate change. The full paper is available for downloading, as is a two-page summary.
We will be presenting our results on November 13th and 14th in Bonn at the Twenty-Third Conference of the Parties (COP-23) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. At the end of this blog essay, I offer some details about these and other forthcoming activities of the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements at COP-23 in Bonn.
Background
Linkage is important, in part, because it can reduce the costs of achieving a given emissions-reduction objective. Lower costs, in turn, may make it politically feasible to embrace more ambitious objectives. In a world where the marginal cost of abatement – that is, the cost to reduce an additional ton of emissions – varies widely, linkage improves overall cost-effectiveness by allowing jurisdictions with relatively higher abatement costs to finance reductions from jurisdictions with relatively lower costs. In effect, linkage drives participating jurisdictions toward a common cost of carbon, equalizing the marginal cost of abatement and producing a more efficient distribution of abatement activities. These benefits are potentially significant: The World Bank has estimated that international linkage could reduce the cost of achieving the emissions reductions specified in the initial set of NDCs submitted under the Paris Agreement 32% by 2030 and 54% by 2050.
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides a foundation for linkage by recognizing that Parties to the Agreement may “choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their” NDCs through “the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs). In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol (which likewise included provisions for international cooperation), the voluntary and flexible architecture of the Paris Agreement allows for wide variation, not only in the types of climate policies countries choose to implement, but in the form and stringency of the abatement targets they adopt.
Heterogeneous Linkage
Linkage is relatively straightforward when the policies involved are similar. However, linkage is possible even when this is not the case: for example, when one jurisdiction is using a cap-and-trade system to reduce emissions while another jurisdiction is relying on carbon taxes. There are several potential sources of heterogeneity: type of policy instrument used (for example, taxes vs. cap-and-trade vs. performance or technology standard); level of government jurisdiction involved (for example, regional, national, or sub-national); status under the Paris Agreement (that is, whether or not the jurisdiction is a Party to the Agreement – or within a Party); nature of the policy target (for examle, absolute mass-based emissions vs. emissions intensity vs. change relative to business-as-usual); and operational details of the country’s NDC, including type of mitigation target, choice of target and reference years, and sectors and greenhouse gases covered.
Analyzing Potential Linkages (Consistent with the Paris Agreement)
The full paper examines five specific cases of linkage, with various combinations of features, to identify which types of linkage are feasible, which are most promising, and what accounting mechanisms are needed to make their operation consistent with the Paris Agreement. Each of the cases maps to a real-world example.
Most forms of heterogeneity – including with respect to policy instruments, jurisdictions, and targets – do not present insurmountable obstacles to linkage. However, some of these characteristics present challenges and call for specific accounting guidance if linkage is to include the use of ITMOs under the Paris Agreement. In particular, robust accounting methods will be needed to prevent double-counting of GHG reductions, to ensure that the timing (vintage) of claimed reductions and of respective ITMO transfers is correctly accounted for, and to ensure that participating countries make appropriate adjustments for emissions or reductions covered by their NDCs when using ITMOs. Additional issues under Article 6 include how to quantify ITMOs and how to account for heterogeneous base years, as well as different vintages of targets and outcomes.
Issues for the Climate Negotiators
Broader questions that bear on the opportunities for linkage under Article 6.2 include the nature of NDC targets and whether these are to be treated as strict numerical targets that need to be precisely achieved; the nature and scope of ITMOs, which have yet to be defined, let alone fully described, under the Paris Agreement; and finally, whether transfers to or from non-Parties to the Agreement (or sub-national jurisdictions within non-Parties) are possible, and if so, how they should be accounted for. Parties have differing views, however, on whether the guidance on Article 6.2 should extend to such issues.
Clear and consistent guidance for accounting of emissions transfers under Article 6 can contribute to greater certainty and predictability for Parties engaged in voluntary cooperation, thereby facilitating expanded use of linkage. At the same time, too much guidance, particularly if it includes restrictive quality or ambition requirements, might impede linkage and dampen incentives for cooperation. Given their limited mandate, Parties should exercise caution when developing guidance under Article 6.2 that goes beyond key accounting issues. This does not mean that concerns about ambition and environmental integrity should be neglected. However, if the combination of a set of common accounting rules and an absence of restrictive criteria and conditions can accelerate linkage and allow for broader and deeper policy cooperation, it can also increase the potential for Parties to scale up the ambition of their NDCs. And that may ultimately foster stronger engagement between Parties (and non-Parties), as well as with regional and sub-national jurisdictions.
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The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements at COP-23 in Bonn
We will conduct three panel events at the Twenty-Third Conference of the Parties (COP-23) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Bonn, Germany, during the week of November 13, 2017. If you have credentials to access the secure area of the COP, you are most welcome to attend any or all of these. Also, COP-23 attendees who wish to meet with the Harvard Project during the conference should email: Jason Chapman (Jason_Chapman@hks.harvard.edu).
Events in Brief:
Heterogeneous Linkage and the Evolution of Article 6
Monday, November 13
12:00 – 1:30 pm
Pavilion of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)
Implementing and Linking Carbon Pricing Instruments: Theory and Practice
Tuesday, November 14, 2017
11:30 am – 1:00 pm
Side Event Meeting Room 12
Carbon Pricing Policy Design
Tuesday, November 14, 2017
2:00 – 3:30 pm
Pavilion of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)
Events in Detail:
Heterogeneous Linkage and the Evolution of Article 6, Monday, November 13, 12:00 – 1:30 pm, Pavilion of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)
Participants:
Jos Delbeke, Director General for Climate Action, European Commission
Kelley Kizzier, Co-Chair, Article 6, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
Michael Mehling, Deputy Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Gilbert Metcalf, Professor of Economics, Tufts University
Robert Stavins, A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, Harvard Kennedy School
Abstract:
The Paris Agreement has achieved one of two key necessary conditions for ultimate success — a broad base of participation among the countries of the world. But another key necessary condition has yet to be achieved — adequate collective ambition of the individual nationally determined contributions (NDCs). How can climate negotiators provide a structure that provides incentives to increase ambition over time? One part of the answer can be facilitating international linkage of regional, national, and sub-national policies. A central challenge is how to accomplish this in the context of the great heterogeneity that characterizes climate policies, along several dimensions, in the context of Paris-Agreement NDCs. Panelists will review the status of linkage in the world, the evolution of Article 6, and the relationship between the two.
Implementing and Linking Carbon Pricing Instruments: Theory and Practice, Tuesday, November 14, 2017, 11:30 am – 1:00 pm, Side Event Meeting Room 12, Co-Hosts: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Enel Foundation
Participants:
Andrei Marcu, Senior Fellow, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
Michael Mehling, Deputy Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Gilbert Metcalf, Professor of Economics, Tufts University
Simone Mori, Head of European Affairs, Enel
Robert Stavins, A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, Harvard Kennedy School
Other participant(s) to be determined
Abstract:
The Paris Agreement has achieved one of two key necessary conditions for ultimate success — a broad base of participation among the countries of the world. But another key necessary condition has yet to be achieved — adequate collective ambition of the individual nationally determined contributions. This panel will consider how this issue might be addressed by international linkage of regional, national, and sub-national policies — that is, formal recognition of emission reductions undertaken in another jurisdiction for the purpose of meeting a Party’s own mitigation objectives. A central challenge is how to facilitate such linkage in the context of the very great heterogeneity that characterizes Nationally Determined Contributions along several dimensions. We consider such heterogeneity among policies, and identify which linkages of various combinations of characteristics are feasible; of these, which are most promising; and what accounting mechanisms would make the operation of respective linkages consistent with the Paris Agreement. The panel will draw in part on a paper by Michael Mehling, Gilbert Metcalf, and Robert Stavins, “Linking Heterogeneous Climate Policies (Consistent with the Paris Agreement),” available here
Carbon Pricing Policy Design, Tuesday, November 14, 2017, 2:00 – 3:30 pm, Pavilion of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), Co-Hosts: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Enel Foundation
Participants:
Daniele Agostini, Head of Low Carbon Policies and Carbon Regulation, Enel
Joseph Aldy [via videoconference], Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Gilbert Metcalf, Professor of Economics, Tufts University
Robert Stavins, A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, Harvard Kennedy School
Other participant(s) to be determined
Abstract:
This panel will review experiences with cap-and-trade and carbon-tax policies, and draw lessons from those experiences. Panelists will also examine the choice between — and design of — such policies, through a political-economy lens, in order to highlight important public policy principles and policy options in carbon-pricing-policy design. The panel will draw in part on a paper by Joseph Aldy, “The Political Economy of Carbon Pricing Policy Design,” available here.
